# EXHIBIT 7

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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE	
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4	S.O.I. TEC SILICON ON INSULATOR : Civil Action TECHNOLOGIES S.A. and :	
5	SOITEC USA, INC.,	
6	Plaintiffs and : Counterclaim Defendants, :	
7	V.	
8	HEMC ELECTRONIC MATERIALS, INC.,	
9	Defendant and	
10	Counterclaim Plaintiff. : No. 05-806 (GMS)	
11	w w	
12	Wilmington, Delaware Thursday, February 28, 2008	
13	10:30 a.m. Telephone Conference	
14		
15	BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY PAT THYNGE, U.S.M.J.	
16	APPEARANCES:	
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18	JOSEPH B. CICERO, ESQ. Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP	
19	-and Brian M. Gaff, ESQ.	
20	Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge LLP (Boston, MA)	
21	-and- Michael Brody, ESQ.	
22	Winston & Strawn LLP (Chicago, IL)	
23	Counsel for Plaintiffs	
24	and Counterclaim Defendants	
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different first names, so that is how I am probably going to 2 refer to you. 3 There is a couple of motions regarding some . discovery disputes. 5 Counsel, before we begin, just a couple of 6 reminders: One, state your name before you begin speaking so that the court reporter, who today is Kevin Maurer, by the way, knows who is speaking. Also, counsel, this is now Judge Sleet's case, and he has not reassigned it to me. But I felt, in light of 11 the fact that we had had discussions about discovery matters, rather than passing it back to Judge Sleet, I 13 should just handle it and take care of it for him. I can't predict what is going to happen in the future in this case.

17 All right. Let's take them in some type of order. Why don't we take the motion for protective order 19 and to exclude a conflicted expert witness, which I believe 20 is Soitec's issue.

if there is any other discovery matters that arise.

I just don't know. So I am not giving you much direction,

21 MR. BRODY: That is correct, Your Honor. Would 22 you like us to speak to it?

23 THE COURT: Sure.

24 MR. BRODY: I think it's pretty straightforward.

We contacted Dr. Rozgonyi a number of months

#### APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

PATRICIA SMINK ROGOWSKI, ESQ. 2 Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz, LLP 3 -and-ROBERT M. EVANS, JR., ESQ., and 4

MARC W. VANDER TUIG, ESQ. Senniger Powers

(St. Louis, MO)

Counsel for Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff

8 9 THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Thynge. (Counsel respond "Good morning.") 10

THE COURT: Counsel, before we begin, who is on 11 12 the line for Soltec?

MR. BRODY: This is Michael Brody, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CICERO: Your Honor, Joseph Cicero from the office of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge here in Wilmington. Michael Brody is on from Winston & Strawn, and Brian Gaff is on from our Boston office.

19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 20

Who is on the line on behalf of the defendants,

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MS. ROGOWSKI: Yes, Your Honor. This is Pat 22 Rogowski of Connolly Bove for MEMC. Also with me will be 23

Bob Evans and Marc Vander Tuig from Senniger Powers. 24 25 THE COURT: Thank you. All of you have

ago. There was an initial conversation in which Mr. Gaff described some of our theories of the case. There was a followup conversation between Dr. Rozgonyi, myself, and Mr. Neuner in which we had some further discussions. Dr. Rozgonyi quoted us a rate. And when we told 5 him it sounded okay to us, he told us he was going to be 7 working for MEMC.

8 There is no question that we sent him a copy of the patent. There is an e-mail from him giving a 9 preliminary read on the patent and on the theories that we 10 11 had discussed with him.

12 THE COURT: Why don't you point out to me, Mike, if you wouldn't mind, in your submission where that shows a 13 copy of the patent, the preliminary read. 14

MR. BRODY: Sure. That is -- hold on.

THE COURT: I know it's under Exhibit A. It's 16 17 what page under Exhibit A?

18 MR. GAFF: Your Honor, I believe that's Exhibit

20 THE COURT: The actual first page.

MR. GAFF: Yes. There is a series of three 21 e-mails on there. At the bottom of that page is the initial 22

23 e-mail from me to Dr. Rozgonyi enclosing the patent. And

then, just above that, there is an excerpt of another e-mail

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A, Page 1.

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1 patent. 2 THE COURT: I just want to double-check, so I 3 make sure we are both on the same page, if you excuse the 4 expression. "Please see, e.g., Column 23, Lines 8 through 5

MR. GOFF: Right. That is a snippet of a second e-mail that I sent to Dr. Rozgonyi after the one just below that on that page, thanking him for his time. Then Dr. Rozgonyi's response is the top of that page.

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THE COURT: Okay. I am trying to go through this. Are you saying the one, "I took a quick look at the patent and think I could help with demonstrating how weak MEMC's position is"?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.

THE COURT: Then he relates to you, he will be at the Hilton and he is off to Italy in two weeks.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's right.

THE COURT: I have read through these. I wanted to make sure what sections you were actually relying on. I have them highlighted.

MR. BRODY: Mr. Gaff, Brian has certainly pointed out the passage.

We are not pretending like we asked Dr. Rozgonyi to spend hundreds of hours on this matter. But there clearly was a series of discussions in which we shared with

requested to perform a service. Essentially, we asked him to give us his preliminary thoughts on the substance of the matter. There is a suggestion in Dr. Rozgonyi's declaration that there is nothing in our conversations that wasn't disclosed in the interrogatory answers. With due

although he quoted us a rate and we proposed to retain him.

He was supplied with some specific material in the case,

that we wanted him to think about, and, of course, our

discussions with him about our thinking. And he was

namely, the patents in reference to the particular portions

13 discussion had to do with the defense under Section 112 of 14 the Patent Act, which is not a defense that was requested in those interrogatories, and actually is not something that --15

respect to his recollection, in fact, the heart of our

16 our thinking on that subject, at least, is not something

17 that we have been asked to share with MEMC. As a result, we 18 haven't.

So he knows about our theory of the case that up 19 20 to now had been confidential. It's a problem for us if he 21 picks up and switches sides.

22 While I realize that folks with these qualifications, you can't exactly find one on every street 23 24 corner, there are a number of people who do this type of work. I don't understand the contention that, in fact, MEMC 25

him our thinking about the case and in which he gave us an initial response that was sufficient for us to conclude that -- and, frankly, for him to initially conclude that he could go forward and provide us with expert support in the matter.

The case that I think gets cited here is the Koch Refining case.

THE COURT: I have read through that. I have also read through the Hewlett-Packard Company matter.

MR. BRODY: Okay. I think the reality, the Koch case kind of sets out two, you know, polar extremes. One is the case where you have basically an extended compensated relationship, and the other is where there is one call. And I think we are clearly in between those.

Here we would say that at the one extreme is, as Koch characterizes it, there was a series of interactions. They did coalesce to the extent that Dr. Rozgonyi understood our position in the case and our theories of it, and did so well enough to be able to give us his preliminary view on the subject.

The other extreme, the Koch Court talks about a situation where you have only one meeting with counsel, which is not the case here. There were at least two substantive discussions.

It's true that Dr. Rozgonyi was not retained,

would be without recourse if Dr. Rozgonyi were disqualified in this case. In fact, they have retained another expert in 2

this matter, who has very strong credentials in this field, 3

and presumably could address these issues if they need him 4 5 to.

So we have a real concern here. I think we had 6 7 a legitimate expectation that we were speaking to Dr. Rozgonyi on a confidential basis. And we would prefer not 8 to see him popping up on the other side. And we think we 9 10 have a right to request that.

11 (Pause.)

> THE COURT: Counsel, we are back. Mr. Maurer expresses his apologies.

14 Michael, are you finished? MR. BRODY: Mr. Gaff has, I think, a brief 15 16 thought to add to this.

MR. GAFF: Your Honor, Brian Gaff here. 17

In my initial conversation with Dr. Rozgonyi, 18 19 the first thing I inquired into was any conflicts of 20 interest on his part, whether he was familiar with the 21 parties who are involved, did he have a working relationship

with any of them currently or any time in the recent past. 22 And he assured me that there were no conflicts. 23 And based on that representation, I then launched into a 24

discussion with him of the details of the case, the history

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have retained.

1 of the dispute, the parties, et cetera. And I can assure 2 you that I would never have had that conversation regarding that subject matter with Dr. Rozgonyi had he indicated that 3 there was a conflict of interest, if, for example, he said 5 he had a relationship with MEMC. 6 It has always been my practice to tell an expert

witness in these discussions that the discussions are confidential and that he should treat information confidentially going forward.

Again, I wouldn't have had the conversation with him had there been any representation on his part that there could have been a conflict of interest.

Thank you.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Is there anything else that the plaintiffs' counsel wishes to add?

16 MR. BRODY: No, Your Honor.

17 THE COURT: Thank you. Can I please hear MEMC's 18 argument.

19 MR. VANDER TUIG: Yes, Your Honor. Mark Vander 20 Tuig for MEMC.

First of all, we would contend that even the details that have been added to the conversations with Dr. Rozgonyi by Soitec during the phone call today, they clearly fall on sort of the initial screening informal relationship side of the spectrum. The details that they have identified

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are those which you have to disclose to any expert to determine whether or not that expert has the appropriate knowledge to be helpful in the case.

I don't think they have identified anything by identifying the copy of the patent and the Column 23 excerpt that has been identified. It's simply the definition section of the '104 patent. They have identified nothing that is anything more than they have disclosed in this lawsuit as far as their theories of the case, their position.

Mr. Brody identified the fact that we never asked about 112. But they have in Interrogatory No. 7, which is attached as Exhibit D to our filing, they did flag an ambiguous defense, which would be under 112, Paragraph 2, they state the phrase "substantially free of agglomerated intrinsic point defects," which happens to be the column number that they referenced here, the column and line number that they reference in their submission. That phrase, they claim, is ambiguous and cannot be construed.

So they have disclosed their position that they think that's indefinite under 112, it is my reading of that. That was just a counter to Mr. Brody's point.

22 They have to identify under the law something 23 24

specific and unambiguous that would prejudice them if it is revealed. I just don't think that they have done so here.

2 experts in this field, it's true that there is, as Mr. Brody 3 points out, there is a limited number with the appropriate 4 qualifications. And I note that Soitec at the time it 5 contacted Dr. Rozgonyi had already retained several 6 witnesses with expertise in this field. 7 THE COURT: I read Soitec's argument, as far as 8 MEMC was concerned on this what you call, I guess, public 9 information or public concern, that MEMC has been able to 10 retain an expert in the same field. 11 MR. VANDER TUIG: They have one expert, that's 12 true. They have retained one expert. Their specialties are 13 a little different. The reason we approached Dr. Rozgonyi 14 was to explore different areas of expertise that wouldn't 15 have been covered by Bergholz, who is the other expert we

To address the point about the limited number of

17 THE COURT: All right. Have you finished your 18 arguments for MEMC?

MR. VANDER TUIG: Yes, Your Honor. 19

20 THE COURT: Is there any brief rebuttal that 21 Soitec wishes to present?

22 MR. BRODY: Your Honor, very briefly, Mr. Vander Tuig is certainly correct that we indicated our view that 23

24 that phrase was ambiguous. The concern is that we talked

with Dr. Rozgonyi about our theories as to why that was the 12

case. And that's what we shared with him, and that's what

we really would prefer not to share with Mr. Vander Tuig and Mr. Evans until we get to the appropriate point in the 4 litigation.

THE COURT: Well, I had a chance to go over the two cases I predominantly looked at, because they seem to 7 have been cited numerous times by both sides, the Hewlett-Packard case and the Koch Refining Company matter, I 8 9 think both of them are instructive to this Court.

I note that one, the Hewlett-Packard case, is from the Northern District of California. The Koch Refining Company case is from the Fifth Circuit. But the issue the way that I was looking at it was the standards that were outlined in both of those opinions. And I also note that in the Hewlett-Packard case there was a bit of a conflict as to what information was conveyed to the expert. And I also note that in the Hewlett-Packard case, the relationship with the expert, from what I can tell, in that case certainly advanced further in my mind, based upon information that was discussed, than what necessarily occurred in this case.

For example, I think counsel in that case claimed the topics he had discussed included impressions of the patent, specific claim limitations, prior art, accused inventions, the type of evidence needed to prove infringement, and the names and qualifications of other

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the adversary.

1 potential expert witnesses.

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Of course, the expert characterized the conversation very differently. So the Court in Hewlett-Packard was faced with some conflicting differences between counsel who had had the discussion with the expert and the expert himself, not too unlike what we have here, that there is a difference between what counsel remembers and what the expert remembered.

In addition, that expert, I think, was compensated for his time that he had spent in his analysis on behalf of the party who had first contacted him.

There is a couple, I think, though, aspects that can't be ignored. One is that although we as Courts have the power to disqualify expert witnesses to protect the integrity of the adversarial process, disqualification is considered to be a drastic measure that the Courts impose hesitantly and rarely.

Also, there is a difference between communication between counsel and an expert and the attorney-client privilege, which was pointed out in the Hewlett-Packard case, noting that experts perform a very different function in litigation than do attorneys, and they are not advocates in the litigation but sources of information and opinions.

What this Court is supposed to look at to

disqualification denied, that is, it is not warranted, even 2 if the expert has signed a confidentiality agreement with 3

Koch and Hewlett-Packard both recognized that you don't have to have a confidential agreement already 5 6 signed. Both cases emphasized what was the relationship and 7 the expectation from, and really what is emphasized is 8 whether there was confidential information disclosed.

As I said, there is a different standard, to some extent, as to what that confidentiality may very well be. Different isn't the right word. It's not the same as 12 attorney-client privilege.

14 particular significance which can be readily identified as either attorney work product or within the scope of 16 attorney-client privilege. And the strategy of the 17 litigation is part of it that the Court takes into account. 18 However, as decided in the Hewlett-Packard case, I find that the discussions between counsel and experts do not carry the 19 20 presumption that confidential information has been 21 exchanged. And the party is required to point to specific 22 and unambiguous disclosures that if revealed would prejudice 23 the party.

Confidential information is information of

24 The Court is also required to consider the 25 issues of fundamental fairness, that is, asking whether the

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determine if a disqualification of an expert is warranted, based upon the prior relationship with an adversary, includes whether the adversary had a confidential relationship with the expert and the adversary disclosed confidential information to the expert that is relevant to the current litigation.

To do the analysis of whether the disclosures were confidential is whether they were undertaken without an objectively reasonable expectation that they would be so maintained as being confidential or if, despite a relationship conducive to such disclosures, no significant disclosures were made, and therefore under those circumstances disqualification would be inappropriate.

It is the burden on the party seeking disqualification of an expert to demonstrate that it was reasonable for it to believe that a confidential relationship existed, and if so whether the relationship developed into a matter sufficiently substantial to make disqualification or some other judicial remedy appropriate.

And in evaluating the reasonableness of the parties' assumptions, there are a number of factors that were pointed out in the Hewlett-Packard case for this Court to look at, which I think have been discussed by the parties in this. And that Court also pointed out, as was oppositely pointed out in the Koch case, that you could have

moving party was unduly disadvantaged and the opposing party 1 2 would be also unduly disadvantaged, and whether any

3 prejudice might occur if the expert is or is not

4 disqualified.

Having considered all those factors, in applying 5 6 it to this case, I am finding that Soitec hasn't met the 7 standards that have been outlined in both the Koch and the 8 Hewlett-Packard case.

9 Recognizing that there is some dispute between 10 the expert as to what was disclosed, I don't think disclosing the patent and suggesting areas of the patent for 11 12 the expert to read is sufficient enough, falls into the 13 category of confidential information.

First of all, the patent is clearly not a confidential document. And pointing out an area or areas that they want the expert to concentrate on is insufficient, in my mind, to necessarily meet the aspect of was confidential information disclosed.

It to me is more like an initial screening process, certainly the type of questions that I believe Brian pointed out that he would have asked the expert, that is to determine if he is qualified, to determine if there is any conflicts of interest. And although, Brian, you may have expected that everything you were going to say to him was confidential, it still had to qualify that what you were

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saying to him qualified as being confidential based upon the relationship or lack thereof that existed between the expert and counsel that was part of the conversation.

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If, as you pointed out to me, Brian, you said you wouldn't have continued the discussions if there had been areas of potential conflict, that's fine. But potential conflict does not necessarily mean information disclosed rises to the level of being confidential. What I have heard so far today, I don't find that to have existed.

So I am not going to disqualify Dr. Rozgonyi in this case in light of the information that has been conveyed to me both in the arguments today and in the written submissions.

I also recognize that there is no doubt that this is a limited area of experts. I find that just because MEMC has retained an expert in this area, that suddenly means that MEMC is locked in and solely -- and that goes to somehow disprove that because it's been able to retain an expert there are available experts elsewhere. I note that parties frequently in patent litigation, and it doesn't seem this litigation is any different in that regard, frequently retain experts within the same field that may have a sub-field of expertise that might be particularly important to certain issues in the litigation.

I also find that some of the information that

was disclosed, apparently disclosed by Soitec to the expert, was also disclosed to the defense. I am not saying necessarily all, but certainly a piece of it. So that again removes the confidentiality aspect to me.

So, therefore, I am finding that, basically denying the motion to disqualify Dr. Rozgonyi.

All right. I think there is a series of different concerns, I believe, that have been expressed in the other motion that was filed in this case. Let me just pull that up, counsel.

Again, this is another motion by Soitec. First of all, it deals with the test data summaries and then your request for documents and deposition testimony relating to the conception of the alleged invention at issue.

So am I correct, this is the two other remaining issues that are both Soitec's?

MR. BRODY: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's do the test data summaries. Michael, what I would like to really know from you is: What are you trying to get? I mean, you said that MEMC has agreed to produce the raw test data. Understand that you are talking to somebody that is completely ignorant about this technological area, so I am not exactly certain what the raw test data doesn't have that the written

technology report summarizing and analyzing the test data

would have, that you would expect it to have.

MR. BRODY: Well, it's got the conclusions.

THE COURT: I understand it has the conclusions.

4 MR. BRODY: The data, it's not an accident that you have somebody write up reports on this sort of data.

The data requires interpretation, and it requires analysis.

THE COURT: And you are basically saying that the sole basis given for MEMC's allegation of patent infringement was the testing that MEMC had performed on the donor wafer seized in the French case. Is that the same argument, is that being made in this case?

MR. BRODY: Yes. In fact, the interrogatory answer, we asked them why do you think we infringe. Their answer was, well, we tested the wafers we seized and we concluded that they infringed. So what I think we are entitled to is both the data on which that conclusion rests and the report drawing the conclusion and explaining the basis for the inference from the data.

So it's a situation where we have, you know, a contention of infringement that purports to be based on a report, and they are giving us half of, you know, the underlying data but not the report.

THE COURT: What do you do about their argument 23 that you could easily conduct your own further testing of 24 these wafers that are in your possession and find out why 25

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they concluded in such a fashion? 1

2 MR. BRODY: I think there are two answers to that. The first is, I think we are entitled to know -- I 3 4 don't understand --

THE COURT: You are entitled to know the basis 5 6 for their contentions.

7 MR. BRODY: Yes, exactly. Our view is that -in fact, we have already produced to them documentation that 8 at least some of the wafers that were seized don't infringe. 9

They apparently reached a different conclusion. So we would 10 11 like to know what it is.

THE COURT: They seem to feel that there is an argument that this is attorney work product.

MR. BRODY: Yes. I am not clear --14 THE COURT: Would you prefer to hear their 15 argument as to the basis as to why it is attorney work 16

product before you try to answer that in the abstract? 17 18

MR. BRODY: Sure. I think that would probably 19 be more productive.

THE COURT: I do, too, because if somebody is alleging attorney work product, the burden is on them to show that it is. So that is my first question to MEMC.

MR. VANDER TUIG: Your Honor, the tests that were run and the summaries that are at issue today were both 24 conducted and put together at the request of counsel for 25

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litigation with Soitec. As such, we think that that is a showing that it is attorney work product.

THE COURT: Let me put it this way: Haven't you put into issue that Soitec infringes? And if these tests were run to show that Soitec has infringed, even though the attorney may have requested them being run, haven't you directly put into issue that particular point?

MR. VANDER TUIG: That would be going towards the waiver argument, I think?

THE COURT: Sort of, yes.

MR. VANDER TUIG: On that point we think that the scope of work product waiver is narrowly construed, and to the extent there was a waiver in our interrogatory responses by alluding to the test data, our agreement with Soitec's counsel to produce the raw test data, the numbers generated by the test methodology that were relied on would be the extent of that scope, that any kind of conclusions or opinions of MEMC's employees who conducted the testing concerning the test data would fall outside the scope of that narrow waiver, if there was one.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. BRODY: I just want to make clear, we are not contending that the production of the raw data was a waiver, because we did have an agreement with Mr. Evans to that effect.

employees at counsel's request.

MR. EVANS: Your Honor, we asked the employee to answer a number of questions for us and look at a number of different things. So he answered our questions in the course of his report. The concern we have is that when we produce anything -- and we will see it in the next question with respect to conception -- every time you do something, somebody says, well, you've waived up to that point, you've waived up to that point.

Our point is to the extent there is infringement in the prefiling investigation, and we believe there is, we have given them all that raw data and answered the interrogatory as to our contention on that, the contention interrogatory.

To the extent we ask an employee in the context of an ongoing lawsuit, you know, specific questions and look at things from different directions, that would seem to be work product.

19 THE COURT: I see what you are saying.
20 MR. EVANS: So this is the employee's analysis
21 that was written from our perspective of, you know, in the
22 context of our discussions with him and what we wanted. All
23 the raw data, they can look at it, they can reach their own
24 conclusions.

Michael Brody, Mr. Brody said that there were

THE COURT: And I wasn't reading that that is what you were saying. I got the read from you, and I wasn't talking about a waiver in the sense of production of, that somehow you waived by producing the raw data.

My question is, haven't you put Soitec's infringement directly into issue in this case? And in doing that, if it's in issue, I don't know how protected anything is, whether it is attorney work product or whatever. But the information that they are asking for, is this information that will be used in the case to prove infringement?

MR. VANDER TUIG: No, Your Honor. We asked Soitec to produce wafers in this case, in the Delaware litigation, and they have. And tests have been conducted and are being conducted on those wafers, and that will be the subject of our expert reports in this case on infringement, and we will not be relying on the prefiling testing that occurred.

THE COURT: But you used the prefiling testing to justify what you started off in this case. Is that correct? So that you could avoid Rule 11.

correct? So that you could avoid Rule 11.

MR. VANDER TUIG: That's correct, Your Honor.

We relied on the test data, the raw test data. We didn't rely on, necessarily, the various opinions and discussions that were in the report that was generated by MEMC's

some wafers where they believe they don't infringe. And we have spoken with Mr. Brody, and we agree with him that on the wafers that showed what we call agglomerated defects, we have agreed with him that those wafers don't infringe.

So we don't have a dispute, I don't think, in terms of what wafers are in true contention here and which ones are not. And we are willing to give them all the raw data, and then they can make their own arguments if they think we have violated Rule 11, to make the argument as to why they think the data doesn't support what we did. We think it supports what we did.

THE COURT: When you gave them the raw data, did you give them the protocols on how they were tested?

MR. EVANS: If we haven't given them how the data was collected, we would certainly be happy to give them the protocols for how it was collected, certainly, yes.

THE COURT: Because the raw data is worthless unless you know how it was tested.

MR. EVANS: No. We are not going to hide behind -- if they need that information or don't have that information, we will certainly get that to them.

THE COURT: So is your argument to me, and explain this to me, that by giving conclusions of why the wafers that are still in dispute infringe, it would constitute basically crawling into your mind as to the type

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of questions that were asked of these employees in doing 1 2 their analysis? 3

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MR. EVANS: Yeah. I think the employee's analysis written for the attorney in response to conversations with the employee is a work product document. He has prepared it for us to address the questions that we asked. And the raw data is what it is. And their expert can look at the raw data and reach whatever conclusions they

So it seems like the employee's impressions and responses to our questions are classic work product.

THE COURT: I understand what you are saying then.

Does that help you a little more, Mike, as to what their basis is for the work product argument? And do you have any response?

MR. BRODY: Yes, it does help me understand. I know you won't be shocked to learn that I still see an issue here.

THE COURT: Did you get the protocols, first of all, on how the testing was done?

MR. BRODY: First of all, we haven't actually gotten all the testing yet or the protocols.

We have had a very good-faith relationship, I 25 think, with Mr. Evans and Mr. Vander Tuig. And if he says

expert what do you think the data shows. We also want to 2 ask our expert, do you think that MEMC was justified in

reaching the conclusion that is stated as a contention in 3

4 the interrogatories. And part of that analysis is understanding precisely the inference that's made from the

data to the contention. And that is what is in the report. 6 7 You know, we have got the conclusion, we will 8

get the data. But we are not being given the glue that holds the two together.

In order to understand whether the contention holds water, I think we are entitled to that.

Now, Mr. Evans, I have forgotten if it was Bob or Marc, indicated that there would probably be further testing, which there may well be. But that actually kind of heightens the importance of exactly the report, because we are entitled to test whatever we ultimately get against what they themselves initially viewed as an appropriate methodology for analyzing these wafers. You know, it may be that the two are perfectly consistent. But it may well be that they aren't.

21 We certainly ought to be in a position to 22 understand that.

The fact that questions were asked the first 23 time around that may or may not have been asked the second 24 time around, you know, again, is really very much fair game. 25

he is going to give us everything up to the reports, it would be uncharacteristic of him not to do that. So I am confident he will give us full disclosure of what the testing was and how it was done. And if we have other questions, I am confident he will give us all that underlying information.

I think the real focus here is on, you know, essentially you have got the testing. You have got a report. Then you have got an interrogatory answer that was provided to us. The real focus is on that intermediate step.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BRODY: And whether that is work product and whether any privilege was waived.

I guess I would say that every expert report is always based on underlying data. If it were sufficient to simply disclose the underlying data, then we wouldn't have some of the provisions that we have in Rule 26, and we wouldn't have anywhere near the sort of disclosure that we typically do, precisely because the reason you ask an expert to prepare a report is to interpret data that is not transparent to lawyers or judges or juries and about which reasonable experts may disagree.

And in evaluating the data -- and more importantly, I mean, it's not just that we want to ask our

Once you get past the step of talking about a consulting 1 expert, once you get to the point where you are relying on 2 an expert to support a contention made in a formal pleading, 3 4 I think all that stuff is out the window.

THE COURT: Well, now, I wonder about that. 5 That's the question I do have. If these individuals are not 6 7 going to be called as experts, or used as factual witnesses for information to reach a conclusion -- the factual 8 information they may have, but whether or not they are 9 10 going -- what I was just told was that the types of questions that were asked of these employees -- and this is 11 how I interpret it, and MEMC can tell me whether I am right 12 or wrong on this -- those types of questions that were asked 13 of those employees on these series of tests, and the 14 findings or conclusions they made, will not be used in this 15 16 case.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's correct, Your 17 18 Honor. MR. BRODY: But they have already been used. 19 They formed the basis of a contention as to our 20 21

infringement. We can't know what the basis of that contention is unless we know what the analysis was that was done to get from the raw data to the contention.

THE COURT: Are you saying, then, that in all circumstances, Mike, that if in support of responding to

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contention interrogatories counsel uses information from a consulting expert, that that consulting expert's analysis then becomes free game?

MR. BRODY: I think if the factual basis for the contention is a report from an expert, that expert is no longer a consulting expert, because, precisely because the work product the expert has generated is no longer being held in confidence. It is being asserted as the basis for the contention.

Think about it from the other direction, Your Honor. If that information could be protected, then what that, in effect, says is you are allowed to know what the contention is but you are not allowed to know why the contention is being made.

 $\label{eq:continuous} \textbf{I} \ \text{just can't -- well, I think we are entitled to} \\ \text{that.}$ 

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. VANDER TUIG: Your Honor, if I may, we are giving them all the facts and the protocols that underlie the investigation. You know, the fact that they are getting all the raw data, they are getting all the protocols for how it is collected, they are going to get that.

Dr. Mulsamuel (phonetic), the person who wrote the report, did not conduct all of the tests. I am not sure if he conducted any of the tests. We had the testing the underlying data, and that's enough to satisfy their
obligation to explain the basis for their contention, then
they probably don't even owe us the testing data. They
could just say, you know, you have got the wafers, here are
the tests that were used, you can go ahead and test them
yourself.

But the point, I think, is that -- it remains their burden of proof and we are entitled to understand the factual basis for their contentions.

On the other side of the coin, Mr. Evans didn't simply get the test results in the interrogatory answer. He didn't ask Dr. Mulsamuel for a report because the data was, you know, self-evident and transparent and there was no need for any further analysis of it. He presumably asked for the report because he needed help from an expert to draw the inference that the wafers infringed.

I don't know that Dr. Mulsamuel went down the claims and did an analysis for him. But presumably he gave him enough information from the perspective of a person of skill in the art of these kinds of testing methodologies that let Bob do the legal analysis on his own.

I don't want Bob's legal analysis. I am not
entitled to it. But I do want to know what the basis of the
legal conclusions was.

THE COURT: The factual basis.

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facilities at MEMC that actually ran the tests. So those are the people that actually did, I believe, most of the lab work.

He wrote the report. When I say report, it's not a Rule 26 report. It's: I asked him questions, he answered the questions, and sent it to me in the form of a report. But he is a nontestifying expert who we asked questions about the data that was collected and he answered them.

So it seems to me that this is -- if on a contention interrogatory they suddenly get all of the sources that the attorney uses to assemble and assess the facts, as well as those independent sources' analysis of the facts, well, then, it seems like contention interrogatories automatically amount to a waiver in every circumstance, and I don't know how that works.

I think you have got to give people the facts.

To the extent contention interrogatories are permissible, you have to answer the contention. But they are not entitled to all the work product you use in the context of the answer you use with the contention interrogatory.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I could

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, if I could
 23 very briefly. I think Mr. Evans's argument, you know, sort
 24 of argues too much and too little.

On the one hand, if all you need is the facts,

1 MR. BRODY: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay. I find that the raw data,

obviously, should be made available, which I understand.

The methodology for analyzing the wafers should also be made available.

The issue gets a bit thornier as to how much further beyond that point Soitec would be entitled to information, because, clearly, Rule 26 recognizes experts that are going to be called upon to testify at trial. And basically it's practically anything and everything they looked at you get access to, even if it didn't become part of their opinion. Then you have got the balancing with it experts that are used in consultation for the purposes of assisting counsel.

I think it gets problematic, although I recognize Soitec's argument that a conclusion was put into the answers to interrogatories, and I think some potential -- let me just try to remember -- response was indicating some of the basis for why the conclusion was what it was. And this is where -- I don't think that counsel is entitled to know what questions were asked of the Doctor.

To the extent that, how he reached his conclusion that there is infringement, that information I do think Soitec is entitled to. That means that may very well be parsing out portions of this report. I haven't seen his

report, so I can't determine that. And to that extent I would be willing to look at it and give you an idea as to what portions of that report I think are discoverable.

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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Would you like us to submit a copy, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. And I could go through it, because it's hard for me to explain it. But why he concluded that they infringed, that type of information I do think is disclosable, but not "Did you look at X to make this conclusion" or "Did you look at Y" or "Have you looked at this," that type of information I don't think is.

So it is parsing it out. I don't know whether you want to try to go through one, run through and produce it and see without me looking at it, because I am no expert in this field by any stretch of the imagination.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I haven't thought about the report from that direction. So I want to look through it and see.

THE COURT: Sure. And if you want me to review it, I will, and try to give some direction as to where I see what type of disclosures I think are appropriate and where I don't think they are appropriate.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would feel more comfortable, probably, with letting you be the arbiter of what should and not be produced to me. Why don't we send

understand, you are requesting documents and deposition

2 testimony relating to the conception of the alleged

3 invention at issue. This I find to be a little thornier,

4 too, as far as analysis is concerned in this. I am really

5 trying to understand what information you are trying to get.

6 I guess you got to provide me with a little bit more

7 specifics, to the extent that you feel comfortable doing

8 that, and what information was allegedly provided, because

9 the two of you seem to be at odds as to what invention

10 disclosure and related testimony was conveyed, because

11 what's been pointed out to me -- and I know the Fed Circuit

12 does recognize this -- is that invention disclosures

13 generally fall within the category of attorney-client

14 privilege.

MR. BRODY: Is it all right if I start on this?
 THE COURT: Absolutely. It is your motion.

17 MR. BRODY: Yes. We are not disputing that 18 invention disclosures are sort of prima facie privileged,

19 and this is a clear waiver issue.

20 Really, there are two things that we are asking 21 for. One is what I will call the '302, the bulk silicon,

 ${\bf 22}$   $\,$  let me put it that way, invention disclosure. And the other

23 is, we are asking to be allowed to pursue some questions

24 with Mr. Hejlek and Dr. Faister about some conversations

25 that they had.

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you a copy of the report confidentially, and go from there.

THE COURT: That is fine. Show me where the areas that were not disclosed — I don't want the raw test data, thank you. It is not going to help me one iota. You can send it to me. But I am not real comfortable I am going to be able to figure out what that means.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There is a fair amount of volume on the actual test data.

THE COURT: I would imagine.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: We are going to give it to them anyway.

THE COURT: Those two points definitely, I think, the methodology and also the raw test data. I don't know how long the report is or how it is broken down.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is not terribly long. Why don't we put together a submission to you that sort of explains what we think should stay in and what should stay out and why in the context of what you are saying now. We will forward it to you and then you can give us guidance or tell us what to do.

THE COURT: That is fine.

The report, obviously, I think maybe -- if I
have any problems I will just get us back on the phone
again.

Okay. The next issue is, from what I

Let me try to be brief about the factual background. But I do think it's helpful here.

Basically, MEMC has two sets of patents. One is
sort of a patent on, if you will, chunky peanut butter. And
another is a patent on putting chunky peanut butter in a
sandwich.

7 MEMC disclosed the -- and, I guess I would add 8 that the patent on chunky peanut butter in a sandwich 9 essentially talks about how great chunky peanut butter 10 tastes and what a wonderful feeling it is.

MEMC has produced the invention disclosure on chunky peanut butter. So one question is whether -- and there is a separate invention disclosure on putting it in a sandwich, which has not been produced.

15 So one question is whether disclosing the
16 invention disclosure or producing the invention disclosure,
17 the feature of the combination that makes it sort of novel
18 and patentable, is a waiver with respect to the subject
19 matter of the second disclosure.

There we think the argument is that the subject matter of the second disclosure, if you will, or the second patent, is inextricably tied up with the subject matter of the first disclosure.

It's not that they are claiming that they invented silicon on insulator or peanut butter and peanut

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butter sandwiches. It is they are claiming that using a particular type of material in these devices, these wafers, makes them particularly desirable.

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In fact, a very large portion, I don't know what the exact percentage is, 30, 40, 50 percent of the disclosure is sort of simply lifted verbatim from the patent on peanut butter.

There is additional disclosure about making the combination, making the sandwich. But there is no question that the subject matter of the second patent encompasses the subject matter of the first patent. Therefore, the subject matter of the second disclosure encompasses the subject matter of the first disclosure.

And they, in effect, are saying, well, notwithstanding that we have waived the privilege with respect to how you make the special spread, we are going to preserve the privilege with respect to a sandwich containing that special spread.

I think that's a pretty clear waiver. If it weren't, even if it weren't, I think that the waiver is compounded by the deposition testimony that we did get. Apparently, what happened is that at some point after the patent issued there was a conversation between counsel and Dr. Falster, the inventor, patent counsel and Dr. Falster, the inventor, about the circumstances under which he

I asked Mr. Hejlek if Dr. Falster's discussion with him had been consistent with what was in the 2 interrogatories. And he was allowed to answer that 3 question, and he said yes. And then I asked, and did he 5 tell you anything else about the conception of the invention or about the meetings. And at that point I was told that 6 7 the testimony was privileged. And then when I took Dr. Falster's deposition, he wasn't even allowed to testify to 9 as much as Mr. Hejlek testified to.

So there is a disclosure out there that either confirms or disconfirms what's disclosed in the interrogatories and what Mr. Hejlek testified to. There is presumably testimony available that goes beyond what was said that's consistent with the interrogatory answer. And we are not being allowed to get it.

I think it's a pretty fundamental rule of waiver law that you can't get a little bit pregnant on these things. If you are willing to disclose part of the story, the stuff that helps, you just got to, you know, give the rest of it up as well. We are entitled to the entire -once they start down the road of sharing with us the privileged information on the conception story, they have to give us the rest of it. And they have given us the invention disclosure on the peanut butter, which they acknowledge is privileged, and which they acknowledge was a

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waiver. They have given us testimony about conversations

And I don't think they can do that.

conceived this invention. Apparently, an issue arose as to 2 whether Soitec was a co-inventor, and, in fact, that is an

issue in the case, and Mr. Hejlek having testified as to a 3

conversation he had with Dr. Falster about whether, in fact, 4

Soitec was a co-inventor, and about a meeting that everybody 5 6

acknowledges took place about almost two years before the

patent was applied for, in which Soitec's folks and Dr.

Falster talked about essentially the combination, the 8

9 subjects of the patents in the case.

> In addition, in their interrogatory answers, and at Dr. Falster's deposition, the story that we have been given is that he conceived of this sandwich in conjunction with a meeting between him and Soitec where Soitec was saying, in essence, we want to make a sandwich of this type. We are looking for suppliers to provide us with this type of peanut butter. Can you do it? And then he spent some time

explaining to them how he thought in fact he could. So, you know, what we have got is a disclosure in the interrogatories as to the circumstances under which -- or some disclosure as to the circumstances under which he claims to have conceived the invention, the invention disclosure as to the critical element in the combination. We have got testimony from counsel about his conversations with Dr. Falster regarding what was disclosed

1 between counsel and the inventor on the conception of the 2 peanut butter, to the extent they are consistent with the 3 interrogatory answer on the conception of the peanut butter. 4 But when we ask, can we see the other stuff that might 5 disconfirm your story, that's when we get the stone wall. 6

THE COURT: They seem to emphasize the timing of 8 9 this discussion as being significant.

MR. BRODY: I saw that. And I apologize. I will express this directly. I don't see that as a response. The fact that the conversation took place after the application was filed probably goes to the question of whether Mr. Hejlek should have disclosed it at some point. But it doesn't go to -- the underlying question is, when did he conceive the invention and under what circumstances. And that's a huge issue in this case, because we think he did it in conjunction with our people, that actually we gave him the basic idea.

He says, no, no, no. I came up with it separately. If Mr. Falster, Dr. Falster, had told Mr. Hejlek last week, you know what, Ed? I have been thinking about it, and Soltec is right, the fact that that came last week or, you know, a year ago or five years ago doesn't have anything to do with it.

in the interrogatories.

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The question is whether they have waived the privilege with respect to facts surrounding the conception of this invention. And the reality is that they have given us admittedly privileged documents -- and they are not asking for it back -- about the conception of the peanut butter, that they have given us testimony about conversations between inventor and counsel, which, you know, are clearly within the scope of the attorney-client relationship, and they want to give us some but not all.

The fact that the waiver, you know, the waivers came both before and after, I suppose the application is being prepared -- I am sorry, the invention disclosure and the conversation came before and after the application was prepared. But the waivers both came in the context of this litigation. And they can't give us some and not the rest.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

From MEMC's part, please?

MR. VANDER TUIG: I guess I will start by saying -- your question to Mr. Brody was what info are you trying to get here. I think what they are trying to get and what we agree they are entitled to are the facts surrounding the conception of the invention claimed in the '104 patent. And they have had a full opportunity, and already have deposed the inventor, Dr. Falster, on this issue. And we did not block on the facts surrounding the conception of the

for all related patents, the attorney-client privilege in those documents is therefore waived. And I think that would be a bad outcome and a very slippery slope.

Turning now to the argument that the interrogatory response somehow waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to conception, there we just set forth the facts of the conception as testified to by our inventor, Dr. Falster. And I just don't quite understand how that can be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 9

Finally, turning to the testimony of the patent attorney, Mr. Hejlek, to the extent, as you correctly pointed out, Your Honor, the disclosure, the discussion there -- let me back up a little bit.

After the prosecutions closed and the '104 patent issued and it was out in the public domain, Soitec started making noise in the marketplace somehow that there is some inventorship issue. And it is at that point that Mr. Hejlek was approached to provide advice on the issue. And to the extent there was any disclosure of the facts of conception through Mr. Hejlek's testimony, it related to that issue and not to anything that occurred during prosecution.

I am kind of at a loss as to how they are unfairly prejudiced and that they can't get the full facts of conception when they are not allowed to probe the

invention.

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I wanted to make that clear.

The info that they are really seeking is, okay, when did you come up with this idea and what were the surrounding circumstances, that they have had full opportunity to depose Dr. Falster on. Now we are just dealing with the waiver issue. And I will take their points one at a time.

The first point that they raise is that MEMC waived the privilege it has in its '104 patent invention disclosure by producing the invention disclosure relating to the '302 patent, the perfect silicate patent. That production of that document occurred in a separate litigation concerning the '302 patent. And it has to do with different subject matter.

The fact that the patents are somehow related, I don't think that carries the day for Soitec. Patents are received all the time on combination of prior developments. Here, this is a classic situation where there was a prior invention and that was built upon, and another patent was received for the combination of prior invention and the new invention.

I didn't notice that Soitec was able to find any authority for the fact that, if you disclose one invention disclosure, all related patents, all invention disclosures

attorney-client privileged communications that occurred 1 2 after the patent issued, so we are dealing with, you know, a hearsay witness -- I am just at a loss as to how they are 3 unfairly prejudiced if they are not allowed to explore those 4 5 communications.

MR. EVANS: Your Honor, one other point I would 7 make is, we answer interrogatories. We object at deposition. We try to be respectful to process and we try 8 9 to make judgment calls as to where privilege starts and stops. And we try not to get the Court involved with a lot 10 of them. We try to be sort of even-handed about it. 11

The frustration that I am feeling a little bit is we provide discovery in good faith, and then suddenly we turn around and we hear because we gave them something we 14 15 are entitled to more. And they try to walk you down the slope.

Here, invention disclosures per the Federal Circuit are clearly a privileged document. The invention disclosure that we did give them was one that had been produced in an earlier litigation. And in that earlier litigation it was produced inadvertently, but it was produced nonetheless. And so since it was out there and we couldn't get it back in that case, we in good faith said, well, it is no longer a privileged document, so we gave it to them here. But it is a patent that is not related to the

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- 1 priority of the patents in suit here. It was an earlier 2 patent. So it is an unrelated patent as a matter of priority. As a matter of subject matter, Mr. Brody is 3 correct, a fair amount of it does appear in the '104 patent, 4 but it appears in the '104 patent in the context of 5 explaining one component, one part, if not the invention, 6 7 you know, that is at issue here.
  - So the law is pretty clear, these documents are privileged. I don't understand why we answer an interrogatory, we, you know, put witnesses up on the facts, and now they think they are entitled to the privileged documents that are also related to other areas, when the Federal Circuit case law is directly against that.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BRODY: Can I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, please do. Because I am now getting the feel that you are talking at cross-purposes. But go ahead.

MR. BRODY: I think there are two critical things here. First of all, the conception of the invention happens when the inventor has in his mind a complete idea of the invention. This invention involves making a sandwich with a particular filling. And in order to have that conception, it was necessary for Dr. Falster to have a conception both of the filling and of the idea of using it

what's disclosed in MEMC's Interrogatory Response to 2 Interrogatory No. 5?

3 So I am asking him directly about a conversation between attorney and client. And I am asking him about the 4 5 substance of that conversation. And I am asking was it consistent with what's in your interrogatory answer. And he 6 was allowed to answer that question. And he said: 7

What's described here is consistent with what my 8 9 recollection is.

And then I said: Did he give you additional information about the conception?

And Mr. Vander Tuig Interposed an objection. 12 And I said, Well, right now I am not asking for the 13 14 substance. I am just asking whether anything else was 15 disclosed.

And Dr. Falster was allowed to answer. He said: Yes, he shared more than what's here with me. Then I said, What else did he share with you? Then the objection was interposed. So he was allowed to -- Hejlek was allowed to testify that Falster said some things that were consistent with what's in the interrogatory and what's been disclosed, that he gave -- that he, Falster, gave Hejlek additional information, and we weren't allowed to inquire about it.

So, you know, they -- if the second question was

in a sandwich.

They have admittedly waived the privilege as to the first part of that conception, but they have insisted that they are entitled to continue to assert the privilege as to the second part.

That I just think is not -- the reason it is not fair is because, with due respect, I am 98-percent sure that when we get that invention disclosure statement, it's going to indicate that he conceived of this two years later and that he didn't acknowledge Soitec's role in it, or maybe it's going to say that he thought of it when he met with Soitec.

But one way or another, it is going to throw light on whether he actually conceived of it on his own and when he did so. They can't give us half of the story and not the other half.

Second. With respect to the interrogatory answer and the testimony, the interrogatory answer discloses their contention as to how the invention was conceived. When I was deposing Mr. Hejlek, I asked him about this conversation with Dr. Falster. He acknowledged that it took

place. Then I said -- this is in Exhibit 4 at Page 152 of 22

23 the deposition:

> Okay. Did Dr. Falster, did his description of the conception of the invention differ in any way from

privileged, so was the first question. And if he is allowed

to answer the first question, he has to be allowed to answer 2 the second question. And what's more, if he is allowed to

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testify, if they are going -- if he is allowed to testify as 4

to evidence that is confirmatory of their contention, we 5

have got to be allowed to see -- and if we are going to get 6

7 the disclosure that's confirmatory of his conception of a

piece of the invention that was prior to the Soitec meeting, 8

we have to be allowed to see the disclosure that goes to the 9

rest of the invention, and we have to get the rest of the

11 testimony.

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I appreciate Bob's comments. But, frankly, from our perspective, it's not that they are being kind of good citizens about this. It's that they have disclosed the stuff that helps them and they are withholding the stuff that may or may not help them.

It's not just that there was a disclosure in a prior case, but there was also disclosure in this case. And they can't -- once they choose to start down the slippery slope, they don't get to be the ones who decide to stop.

If there really was an inadvertent disclosure in 21 the prior case, then presumably they were entitled to get 22 23 that back. There is tons of law about how inadvertent disclosure is not a waiver and documents can be gotten back. 24 25 All of that is well-established. Even if they couldn't have

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gotten it back there, at least they could have contended here that that disclosure was inadvertent and they could have sought to reestablish the waiver in this case.

But they didn't. They gave us what they wanted to give us on this story, and they haven't given us the rest. And they just can't do that.

MR. VANDER TUIG: Your Honor, may I respond?

8 THE COURT: Sure. 9 MR. VANDER TUIG: I just wanted to point out 10 that -- first of all, we are not going to rely on Mr. Heljek

as some sort of corroborating witness on conception, which 12 the unfairness argument seems to rely on. And secondly, on the pages of that deposition transcript of Hejlek that

14 follow the part that Mr. Brody pointed out, we actually took a break and Mr. Hejlek came back and described some of the 15

16 situations -- some of the facts, that he was aware of 17 various stuff relating to the meeting that they are

concerned about.

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So I don't think it's accurate that we cut him off and only allowed him to confirm the accuracy of the facts in the interrogatory response. In fact, if you read Pages -- this is in the exhibit, I can't remember which exhibit -- but it is Pages 154 through to about 158 or so, or even further, there is a point where the line was eventually drawn is when they wanted to get into Mr.

inventor, who is an employee of the party, which makes it 2 squarely an admission.

3 So, you know, they can't have it both ways. It 4 can't both be the case that Hejlek's conversation with 5 Falster about conception -- and there is no question that 6 they had a conversation about conception -- it can't both be 7 that that conversation was privileged, which it clearly was, 8 and that they are allowed to testify as to that 9 conversation, and then say, but, you know, that's all you 10 get.

So we have got Hejlek's version of a conversation on conception ---

THE COURT: Let me just finish this. You should have been entitled to get Hejlek's recollection of what the conception was once it was allowed, you should have been allowed to ask the Doctor the same type questions to confirm it. The issue then that I think that is left is what do we do about the invention disclosure statement.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Let me speak directly to 20 that, if it is okay.

21 THE COURT: Yes. Because that, I will tell you 22 right now, is the one that is giving me probably the most 23 indigestion.

24 MR. BRODY: We tried to save the hard ones for 25 you, Judge.

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Hejlek's legal advice relating to the situation that developed after the '104 patent had issued where the line was drawn.

So this unfairness argument really, I don't think there is much substance to it because they did actually get from Mr. Hejlek all the facts that they wanted relating to the October '96 meeting and what Mr. Hejlek was aware of, the facts that he was aware of concerning that meeting. I wanted to clarify that.

MR. BRODY: With due respect, first of all, please do look at the transcript. You know, eventually we were not allowed to inquire. But the fact that he was allowed to answer further questions, you know, merely compounds the waiver with respect to whatever may have been -- whatever the underlying evidence is with respect to Falster's conception.

At Falster's deposition, we weren't allowed to ask anything. And we still haven't seen the disclosure statement.

You know, it's not that we are looking to Hejlek to corroborate Falster's testimony. Frankly, we think that if we are allowed the discovery, we are going to be getting evidence that disconfirms the contentions. And that is exactly what we are looking for.

This isn't hearsay. This is testimony by the

1 If we are entitled to that testimony, then the 2 reason we are entitled to the testimony is because there is 3 a subject matter waiver as to what was communicated between 4 attorney and client about conception. And that's exactly 5 what the written disclosure statement is.

You know, there apparently were three communications between Falster and his lawyers about his conception of this invention. One was the initial invention disclosure on the bulk silicon patents, the peanut butter patents. The second was a conversation between Hejlek and Falster about the conception of the peanut butter sandwich patent. And the third is the written disclosure about the conception of the peanut butter sandwich patent.

14 If there is a waiver as to the first and the third communications, then there is also a waiver as to the 15 16 second, because it's the same subject matter. It's the same 17 as if there had been a subsequent or a prior conversation 18 about conception. They can't waive with respect to one 19 conversation and not with respect to the other.

20 They can't waive with respect to the oral 21 communication and not with respect to the written 22 communication.

23 That is the unfairness.

24 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VANDER TUIG: Can I respond, Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Yes. MR. VANDER TUIG: I would just like to point out that Mr. Hejlek clearly said that he did not have a conversation about conception. He had a conversation with Dr. Falster about this October meeting from which Soitec was making these inventorship allegations after the '104 patent issued. If you look at Page 156 of the transcript that Soitec submitted ---

THE COURT: Let me say this: The problem that I am facing in this is the fact that, apparently, is it Dr. Falster, was cut off with some information relating to conception. There was some exploration, and probably what's been represented to me, further exploration allowed with the attorney. And that was even piece-mealed out.

The problem that I have is, did that go to waiving the -- and I think there was a waiver. If this was confidential, you just don't suddenly say, we only waived this section of it, we didn't waive the rest. I do think you did.

The question I have is, that I am asking is, does that constitute a waiver of the invention disclosure.

MR. VANDER TUIG: Well, Your Honor, my point was that you did not -- that the Hejlek testimony was not to conception but it was to the fact of this October '96 meeting which Soitec alleges was, when their employee came

THE COURT: Let's look at Page 155. It starts out where there was a meeting that was attended by Dr. Faister at Soitec's office sometime in October of '96.

4 So he brought to my attention the meeting and the fact that he conceived it before the meeting.

I am sorry, I overlooked that before. When you 6 7 say conceived it, I take it you are saying in conjunction 8 with the meeting, he had conceived the invention before 9 attending the meeting.

10 Then: Did he tell you when he had conceived it? The answer was, I do not recall the date.

12 Not that he didn't know the date. That he 13 didn't recall it.

Did he tell you anything about the circumstances under which he had conceived the invention?

16 No. That was a question you asked me before.

17 No.

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18 So the privilege doesn't even apply then, I 19 guess, if I looked at this literally, the fact that Dr. 20 Falster has circumstances under which he conceived the invention that he didn't share with his attorney, that 21 22 obviously isn't even subject to privilege.

23 Have you seen any written material corroborating 24 his recollection as to his conception of the invention? 25

Other than the invention disclosure, no.

up with the idea, rather than the conception of the invention. We submitted in our submission the fact that Mr.

Hejlek testified that he never had a conversation with Dr.

Falster about conception during prosecution of the '104

patent. And at Page 156 of the transcript that Soitec

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THE COURT: But that may go to inequitable conduct. I don't know whether it goes to conception and reduction to practice.

MR. VANDER TUIG: The point is they didn't talk about conception. They talked about this October meeting, which is different.

So to address one other point that he raised, Dr. Falster was not cut off as to the facts of conception. They had a full opportunity to explore all the facts relating to his conception of the idea.

He was instructed not to answer when he was asked what conversations he had with Hejlek after the '104 patent issued, that conversation we have been talking about. He was not allowed to talk about that conversation. But he was -- I mean, he testified fully about the facts of conception.

23 I mean, there is no unfairness here, Your Honor. 24 They have all the facts they need. I am not sure what else 25 they want.

1 So, you know, those four series of questions 2 seems to be in conflict with one another. But what the attorney said was he didn't tell him anything about the 3 circumstances under which he had conceived the invention. 4 5 Have you seen an invention disclosure 6 corroborating his concept of, his account of the conception 7 of the invention?

8 And then the attorney says, you asked his 9 account. Do you mean this account? I am not sure what you 10 mean because you sort of moved your hand like it was 11 supposed to communicate something.

I communicated that I was moving my hand, I think nothing more.

Have you seen any written material corroborating 14 15 the account of the conception of the invention that's set 16 forth in Interrogatory No. 5 and apparently was communicated 17 to you sometime between 2001 and 2005?

I don't recall any such documents.

19 So he is saying I don't recall. He is not 20 saying he didn't have it.

Have you spoken with anybody other than Mr. 21 22 Falster about who corroborated his account? 23 Answer: As to what subject?

24 As to the conception of the invention that's set 25 forth in response to Interrogatory No. 5.

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1 To corroborate the date, no. 2 To corroborate any other aspect of the 3 conception? 4 5 So it is clear that he had conversations with 6 Foster about something. But it's not clear to me what's 7 even under the privilege at this stage of the game. 8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That is one of the 9 struggles, Your Honor, at the deposition, is to figure out 10 where to draw lines. 11 THE COURT: That is the problem. That is the 12 reason why I am finding that you are going to produce the 13 invention disclosure. I think there is enough here that has 14 caused -- I don't think the Court can, in the end, parse 15 out, okay, this much we disclosed and we allowed it and we 16 were good guys by disclosing it, but the rest of it we are 17 going to protect. I think there has been a whole host of 18 related subject matter that has been disclosed. I am not 19 just relying upon the fact that the disclosure of the 20 disclosure statement of the '104 patent was produced. 21 It seems to me that trying to draw these nice, 22 little lines and areas is just, if you will excuse the 23 expression, dammed near impossible. 24 So the disclosure statement for the, my 25 understanding of the patent that is in dispute here, which

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is, I think is the '302 disclosure, will be provided. 2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It is the '104, Your 3 Honor. THE COURT: It is the '104 in this case but the 4 5 '302 had been disclosed. 6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes. THE COURT: I got them confused. I apologize. 8 Then the '104 will also be disclosed. 9 So I think I have covered all the issues that 10 were addressed by the parties in their two submissions, 11 except for the one thing that is left is if you wish me to 12 do that review. And I will do it. 13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. 14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you very much for 15 your patience, Judge. 16 THE COURT: It's not patience. It's just trying 17 to parse out what you are asking me to do. And sometimes I 18 can't do the impossible. It's just easier to try to draw 19 some line someplace. 20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you, all. 22 (Teleconference concluded at 12:05 p.m.) 23 Reporter: Kevin Maurer 24

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